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ZONING AND THE AMORTIZATION OF
NONCONFORMING USES

I.

INTRODUCTION

A problem that has long confronted city planners and zoners is
the question of what to do with existing structures and uses of land
that do not conform to the requirements of a comprehensive zoning
ordinance on the date of its enactment. A possible solution to this
problem is the use of "amortization" as a means of eliminating such
nonconformities. "Amortization" allows a nonconforming user to continue after the enactment of the ordinance, but only for a limited
period of time. The amount of time allowed must be reasonable and
varies with the nature of the use sought to be eliminated.
The purpose of this note is to examine the theory of amortization,
the factors to be considered, its implementation in various jurisdictions, and its application to North Dakota. Approximately one-half of
the states, including North Dakota, have not yet been judicially confronted with the issue of the validity of amortization. Of the states
that have ruled on its validity, the majority have approved. A substantial minority, however, have flatly rejected it as unconstitutional.
A survey of the relevant case law is therefore included in this note.
Amortization ordinances are presently in use in a few cities in
North Dakota and are discussed in this note. Whether judicial approval in North Dakota will be forthcoming remains to be seen.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

NORTH DAKOTA ZONING HISTORY

In 1923 the North Dakota Legislature enacted the first law giving
municipalities the power to regulate structures and land use. 1 This
enabling act was based upon the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
promulgated by the United States Department of Commerce in 1922,2
1.
1923 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 175 ("ricinally codified at 191:1 N.D. COMPILED LAWS,
POLITICAL CODE, ch. 44, art. 23;L (Supp. 1926), currcnty codifie) at N.D. CENT. CODE Ch.
40-47 (1968 & Supp. 1977)). Similar powor is granted to counties in N.D. CENT. CODE ch.
11-33 (1976 & SUpp. 1977), and to townships in N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-03-11 through
15-03-15 (1972).
2. ADVISORy COMeM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COM.XMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING
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and was adopted almost verbatim.3 The constitutionality of this enabling act was soon challenged after the city of Bismarck passed
a comprehensive zoning ordinance pursuant to the power granted
by the Act. In City of Bismarck v. Hughes 4 the enabling act was
challenged as an unconstitutional grant of police power by the state,
and the city ordinance was challenged as an unconstitutional taking
of private property for public use without compensation and as an
unconstitutional denial of due process of law.5 The North Dakota
Supreme Court in 1926 upheld the constitutionality of the Act and
of the city ordinance. 6 The court stated as follows:
The Enabling Act is a general law which applies to every
city in the state of 6,000 inhabitants or more, and the ordinance is a general law that affects all parts of the city,
and treats each section according to its own peculiar need,
present and prospective. It operates equally upon all residents
in zoning districts. It is not in conflict with the law of eminent domain, for it does not take property; it only regulates
its use. It is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
state, a power which section 134 of the [North Dakota]
Constitution recognizes and declares shall never be abridged.
The police power is an attribute of sovereignty itself, under
which life, liberty, and property are made safe. It is necessary for the preservation of the state and the welfare of
society. It is a legislative function without limitation, except
that it must not conflict with the state or federal Constitution,
and unless the statute is clearly repugnant to some constitutional guaranty, the courts cannot interfere. The police
power is one of the most essential powers of the government,
and one of the least limitable, and the imperative necessity
for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not
arbitrarily used. All rights are subject to the police power. 7
At the time the Hughes court made its decision, it considered
the case of Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid," in which a
federal district court in Ohio had held invalid a comprehensive
zoning ordinance.9 The Hughes court decided not to follow the
3. See I N. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN PLANNING LAW, LAND USE AND THE POLICE
POWER 361-70 (1975) for a section by section, state by state analysis of the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act. See also N. BAKER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING (1927) for an
early commentary on the Act.
4. 53 N.D. 838, 208 N.W. 711 (1926).
5. Id. at 843, 208 N. V. at 713. The Bismarck ordinance had divided the city in four
use districts, A-Resitlential, B-Residential, C-Commercial and D-Industrial. The owners of a vacant lot located in the A-Residential district had applied to the city board of
adjustment for a permit to build a four family apartment house on the lot. Their request was denied because, undler the ordinance, the building could accommodate no more
than two families. The owners began construction of a four family apartment house in
defiance of the board's denial and the city sought and was granted an injunction, from
which the defendants appealed. Id. at 842-43, 208 N.W. at 712-13.
6. Id. at 851, 208 N.W. at 716.
7. Id. at 844, 208 N.W. at 713.
,. 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rcv'd, 272 U.S. 165 (1.26).
9. The Euclid zoning ordinance was based on the Zoning Resolution of the Cit, of

NOTES

reasoning of this case, 10 and six months later the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Ohio federal district court and held
the Euclid comprehensive zoning ordinance valid." Since that time,
the constitutionality of zoning in general has not been seriously questioned.

B.

12

THE NONCONFORMING

USE

A perplexing problem in zoning has been the question of what
to do with buildings and land uses that do not conform to the zoning
ordinance at the date of enactment and which lawfully existed prior
to the effective date of the ordinance. In fact, the nonconforming
use "has often been regarded as the most important single problem
in American zoning. . . . ,,1 "[T]here is general agreement that
the fundamental problem 14facing zoning is the inability to eliminate
the nonconforming use.'

In the years when zoning ordinances were first being enacted,
New York, which was adopted In July 1916, and which was the first comprehensive
zoning ordinance in the United States. 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNINo § 1.01 at 1-6 (4th ed. 1975).
10. 53 N.D. at 850, 208 N.W. at 716.
11. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Hughes court
may have foreshadowed the United States Supreme Court In more than one respect. The
court also stated as follows:
There was a time when a "man's home was his castle," and when "There
was no place like home though ever so humble." Now we are told that in a
few years there will be no homes; that every one will be living in hotels
and apartment houses and eating in restaurants. The breaking up of the home
and the raising of children in hotels, apartment houses, and upon the streets
is responsible for the great increase in the delinquency among children and
for the increase in crime. The establishing of zoning residence districts and
regulations encouraging the building of homes with yards for children to play
In, to work in, and grow healthy in, doubtless Influenced the Legislature to
pass the .Enabling Act, to promote the general welfare of the city and its people.
53 N.D. at 851-52, 208 N.W. at 716-17. Forty-eight years later, the United States Supreme
Court, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), an exclusionary zoning case
Involving the meaning of the word "family," stated as follows:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family
needs. This goal Is a permissible one. . . . The police power is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
d. at 9.
12. See R. LiNowEs & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE POLITICS OF LAND-USE LAW: DEvELOPERS
VS. CITIzENs
GROUPS IN THE COURTS 35 (1976), where they state as follows: "The Supreme

Court has taken only six zoning cases in its history, and in none of these cases did it
ever overrule zoning per se. . . . [T]he court has almost always upheld government power
to regulate and has never held against zoning in any basic sense." See also N. .BAKER,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING (1927), for an analysis of early zoning cases, and where he
states as. follows:
Zoning is a splendid illustration of the development of our law. A generatIon ago, zoning would have been unconstitutional. Its constitutionality was
questioned quite generally five years ago. Todhy, if an ordinance be reasonable and comprehensible, and based upon a proper enabling act, giving opportunity for a hearing before a board of appeals, the great weight of authority favors Its legality.
Id. at 141.
13.

4 N.

WILLIAMS,

§ 116.01 at 517 (1975).

JR., AMERICAN PLANNING

LAW, LAND

USE AND THE POLICE POWER

14. Grant v. Mayor & Cty Cnuncil of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, (1957).

, 129 A.2d 363, 365
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no provisions were made for the termination of nonconforming uses.
The -ordinances regulating the use of land were prospective only
and the general rule has been that lawful uses and structures in
existence at the time of enactment of the ordinance, although not
in conformance with the ordinance, would be allowed to continue. 15
Nonconforming uses were originally not considered detrimental to
the over-all effectiveness of a comprehensive zoning ordinance. The
early drafters of zoning ordinances believed that nonconforming uses
would be few in number and that they would gradually disappear
over time due to restrictions on their expansion. In addition, at a
time when zoning ordinances per se were of doubtful validity, immediate termination 'of nonconforming uses might have aroused strong
opposition by property owners and could have jeopardized the chance
for any zoning. 16 Therefore, instead of immediate termination, most
zoning ordinances have sought to restrict, and thereby hopefully to
gradually eliminate nonconforming uses by providing that the property owner will not be allowed to enlarge or extend the use, rebuild
or make alterations to the building, resume the use after discontinuance or abandonment, or substitute another nonconforming use.17
Nonconforming uses have not disappeared as hoped. In fact, by
virtue of their somewhat monopolistic position within the districts of
a community and because of city standards of fitness of buildings,
they have tended to become even more entrenched."' Municipal
authorities generally do not have the resources necessary to closely
supervise nonconforming uses, and if the ordinance restrictions on
nonconforming uses are ever enforced, it probably reaches 'only a
small number of nonconforming uses and is largely a matter of
chance. 19 As one writer noted, "There is little indication . . . that
20
nonconforming uses ever do disappear."
III.

THE THEORY OF AMORTIZATION
Although some -of the early zoning cases approved summary

15. See A E. MCQuLLLIN, TIE LAW OF MUVNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.180 a.t 6 (3d e: .
1976). See atIs( Midg.arden %. Grand Forks, 79 N.D. IS, 54 N.W.2d 659 (1952).
16. For conllentary on the historv of nonlonformng uses, see generally City of Los
Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, -, 271 P.'-d 34, 40-41 (1954) : Board of Supervisors of Cerr
Gordo County v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 35S, 361-62 (Iowa 1969)
Grant v.
Mayor & City Council of B-altimore, 212 Md. 301, , 129 A.2d 363, 365 (1957) : Naegele
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonlka, 2,1 Minn. 492, , 162 N.W.2d 206,
213 (1968)
1 It. ANDERSON, AMEICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.02 at 3,5-58 (2d ed. 1976)
I E.

YOI.IEY.

ZONIN,;

1,A\V AND I'I:ACTICI;

9

1-3 to 1-9. at 5-13 13d

-d. 1!16.).

17. See 2 A. IHATHItIOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 62-2 to 62-4 (3d ed. 1972).
See, e.q., DICKINSON, N.D CITY CODE, Appendix A, ! 6 (1!t54);
FARGO, N.D. REVISED
ORImNANCES § 20-0:1,20(1972) ; WILLISTON, N.D. CITY CODE, Appendix A, § 16 (1957).
1S. SeC sullpri note 16.
19. The dearth of case lIw on this subject Jn North Dakota may be an example. The
only reported c(',. wh,'re a city sought to enfnri-e its nonconforming use ordinance is City
of Minot v. Fisher, 212 N.\V.'d 837 (N.D. 1,973). where the city's effort to terminate a
nonconformin use(tin the grnund] of alandonment was dismissed.
20.
'Note,. A
ti:ttiol ,,f Property
s,,s Not
'.l\,
Cn form jilt
tO o n 1o1i Reg to n. 9
.
1194'-').
('1 I. L. 13EV. 477. .179
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termination of nonconforming uses,' 1 it was soon recognized that
immediate termination would be unreasonable.2 2 As the result of the
inability of zoning restrictions to eliminate nonconforming uses, a
more positive approach to the elimination of nonconforming uses has
23
been devised, that of amortization.
Under an amortization ordinance, the nonconforming user is
given a certain period of time over which he is entitled to continue
his use. At the end of this period, the nonconforming use must
cease.2 4 The theory of amortization is that the use is allowed to
continue for no longer than the useful economic life of the nonconformity, and that during this period of grace, the owner will recoup
his investment. 25 Since the owner will theoretically fully depreciate
the value of his use during this time, the forced termination will
not be a "taking" of private property in violation of the state or
2
federal Constitution. 6
Once the validity of the amortization technique in general has
been recognized, the focus has been on the reasonableness of the
length of the grace period allowed under the ordinance for the type
of use sought to be eliminated, and then on the reasonableness of
the application of the ordinance to a particular case. 2 Factors which
should be considered in determining reasonableness include the nature of the use, the character of the neighborhood in which it is located, the amount of investment involved, and the cost of relocation.28 Above all, the public benefit to be gained by the forced termination must outweigh the private detriment incurred by the owner. 29
21. See, e.g., St. Louis Poster Ad'ertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919)
(billboards) ; Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917)
(billboards) : Hadachek v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard) ; Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915)
(livery stable). See also Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 457,
463-67 (1941).
22. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 204, 295 P. 14 (1931) ; Standard Oil Co.
V. City of Bowling Green, 244 Ky. .362, 50 S.AV.2d 960 (1932); Amereihn v. Kotras, 194
Md. 591, 71 A.2d 865 (1950) ; Des Jardin v. Town of Greenfield, 262 Wis. 43, 53 N.W.2d
784 (1952).
23. Actually, "amortization" Is somewhat of a misnomer since the process is more akin
to that of "depreciation." To a tax accountant "amortization" is the process of writing
off the cost of an intangible asset to expense, while 'depreciation" refers to writing off
tangible assets. K. SoLoMuoN, LAWYER'S 1-tANDBOOK OF .ACCOUNTING THEORY AND PRACTICE
25, 32 (1971). Therefore, when the term "amortization" is used, the drafters of ordinances
are actually referring to the concept of "depreciation." See also I..C. § 167.
24. See City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d' 442, , 274 P.2d 34, 41 (1954),
citig Crolly & Norton, Termination of Noncolnforminy Uses, 62 ZONING BULL. 1 (1952).
See alm

ifra note 2! .

25. If the nonconforming user is already depreciating his property for tax purposes, see
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-t(b) (1972) which allows a depreciation period to be changed
whenever "the change in the useful Ife is signifirant an 9 there is a, clear and convincing
basis for the redetermination." See also Treas. Reg. 3 1.167(a)-9 (1960) which allows a
depreciation period to be shortened due to obsolescence caused by legislative action.
26. See City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, , 274 P.2d 34, 44 (1954).
27. See Haiarbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 561-63, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 604-05, 152
N.E.2d 42, 46-47 (1958).
28. 82 ANT. JuR. 21 Zoning and Planning § 189 (1976).
29. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 3§ 6.66-6.72 at 507-29
(2d ed. 1976) SA ,. '\1cQUILLTIN, THE LAW 1F MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.190 at 40-1l
(3d ed. 1976)
2 A. IATHKEPE, THE LAW ',F ZONING NND 'LTANNING 62-4 to 62-6 (3d ed
1 972).
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THE CASE LAW

There is no reported North Dakota case dealing with the issue
of amortization. Although in use in a few North Dakota municipalities
to a limited extent," ° amortization is not yet widespread in North
Dakota as a method of eliminating nonconformities. Inasmuch as
the validity of amortization has not yet been decided in this state,
an examination of the activity in other jurisdictions appears appropriate. While many states, like North Dakota, have not yet been
judicially confronted with the issue of amortization, the following
survey includes most of the states that have decided the issue. The
greater weight of authority approves of the termination of nonconforming uses through amortization. 3 1
A.

J URISDICTIONs

1.

APPROVING AMORTIZATION

California

Amortization of nonconforming uses was expressly recognized
as a legitimate use of the police power in City of Los Angeles v.
Gage in 1954.32 In this case, the defendant owned a two story building, the upper part of which was used for residential rental purposes,
and the lower part of which was used for a wholesale and retail
plumbing supply business. The business use was permitted when
begun in 1930. In 1946, however, the city rezoned the area for residential use only and provided that nonconforming commercial or
industrial uses in a residential building were to be terminated within
five years. The ordinance was held valid by the court. The court
recognized that it was never intended that nonconforming uses be
perpetual and that the "presence of any nonconforming use endangers the benefits to be derived from a comprehensive zoning
plan. 3 3 The defendant argued that the ordinance resulted in an
unconstitutional taking -of his property. To this argument, the court
responded as follows:
The elimination of existing uses within a reasonable time
does not amount to a taking of property nor does it necessarily
restrict the use of property so that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose. Use of a reasonable amortization
scheme provides an equitable means of reconciliation of the
conflicting interests in satisfaction of due process requirements. As a method of eliminating the existing nonconforming uses it allows the owner of the nonconforming use, by
affording an opportunity to make new .plans, at least partially
30.
31.
32.
33.

See notes 129-36 infra, and text accompanying.
See 2 E. YOKELEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 16-14 at 282 (3d ed. 1965).
127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
Id. at -,
274 P.2d at 43.
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to offset any loss he might suffer. The loss he suffers, if
any is spread out over a period of years, and he enjoys a
monopolistic position by virtue of the zoning ordinance as
long as he remains. If the amortization period is reasonable
the loss to the owner may be small when compared with the
benefit to the public. Nonconforming uses will eventually be
eliminated. A legislative body may well conclude that the
beneficial effect on the community of the eventual elimination of all nonconforming uses by a reasonable amortization
plan more than offsets individual 'losses.3 4
2.

Colorado

In Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi,3 5 a nuisance case brought by a
greenhouse operator seeking an injunction against a neighboring
brick company, the Colorado Supreme Court, in dictum, recognized
that the Colorado County Planning Act, 36 in providing for county
zoning, had also provided for amortization of nonconforming uses.37
The court denied the injunction but stated that although the county
in this case had allowed nonconforming uses to continue, it could
have made a provision for the termination of nonconforming uses.38
In 1972, the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed the Robinson case in
Hobbs v. Smith39 and stated as follows:
It is our view that Robinson does, in effect, hold that
where there is an adequate legal remedy which provides for
the orderly termination of a non-conforming use, an injunction which is unduly harsh in its application will not be allowed to be used as a substitute for those legal means of
phasing out the non-conforming use.4 0
Subsequently, in Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver,4 1 the
tenth circuit, in applying Colorado law, held that a sign amortization ordinance, although invalid to a small extent, was basically
34. Id. at , 274 P.2d at 44. See also National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 865, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577, 464 P.2d 33 (1970); Livingston Rock & Gravel
Co. V. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P.2dl 4 (1954); McMahan's Furniture
Co. V. City of Pacific Grove, 219 Cal. App. 2d 732, 33 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1963); City of La
Mesa v. Tweed & Gambrell Planing Mill, 146 Cal. App. 2d 762, 304 P.2d 803 (1957).
35. 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (194,6).
36. 1939 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 92 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. ch. 30-28 (1974 &
Supp. 1976)).

37. Id. at § 19 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-120 (1974)). § 30-28-120 provides,
In part, as follows:
The board of county commissioners, in any zoning resolution, may provide
for the termination of nonconforming uses, either by specifying the period
In which nonconforming uses shall be required to cease or by providing a
formula whereby the compulsory termination of a nonconforming use may
be so fixed as to allow for the recovery or amortization of the Investment
In the nonconformance.
38. 115 Colo. at , 169 P.2d at 173.
39. 177 Colo. 299, 493 P.2d 1352 (1972).
40. Id. at , 493 P.2d at 1355. See also Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 181 Colo. 309,
509 P.2d 588 (1973).
41. 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
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valid and reasonable. 4 The Colorado Supreme Court, in 1975, again
recognized the validity of amoitization in Combined Communications
Corp. v. City and County of Jenver. 43 In this case, however, the
court held the amortization ordinance invalid as applied in that the
ordinance was unreasonable when its effect was to eliminate an
44
entire industry, outdoor advertising, from the city.
3.

Connecticut

The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, in Franklin Furniture
Co. v. City of Bridgeport,"' acknowledged the validity of an amortization ordinance requiring the removal of existing nonconforming
signs within two years. The court stated as follows: "The police
power is not confined narrowly within the field of public health, safety
and morals. It is within the police power to regulate occupations or
businesses which, owing to their nature or the manner in which they
are conducted, may be detrimental to the general welfare." 4 1
4.

Florida

The fifth circuit, applying Florida law in Standard Oil Co. v. City
of Tallahasee,47 held a ten year amortization ordinance valid as applied to an automobile service station. The court stated, "The general
rule here applicable is that considerations of financial loss or of socalled 'vested rights' in private property are insufficient to outweigh the necessity for the legitimate exercise of the police power
of a municipality."4
5.

Illinois

In Village of Oak Park v. Gordon," the Illinois Supreme Court
held an amortization ordinance invalid and unconstitutional as applied. In this case, a 1921 ordinance had zoned an area residential
but had allowed owners to rent up to four rooms. A 1947 ordinance
amended this to two rooms but allowed prior nonconforming uses
to continue. In 1958, an amortization ordinance was passed requiring
conformance within five years. The court, while holding that there
was no evidence that the public interest would be served as opposed
to the defendant's financial loss in converting, did approve of the
12.
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3.
44.
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principle
appellate
provision
valid on
6.

of amortization in general." The following year, the Illinois
court, in Village of Gurnee v. Miller," held an amortization
requiring termination of junk yards within thirty-six months
2
the basis of Gordon.5
Iowa

In Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 53 the owner of
billboards brought an equity action against the city to enjoin enforcement of a zoning ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of
existing billboards within certain zones of the city and requiring
removal within two years. The Iowa Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due process of law because it could find no evidence on the record to support
the reasonableness of the ordinance. The court stated, however, as
follows:
We do not wish to infer herein that under certain circumstances a municipality could not provide for the termination
of nonconforming uses, especially if the period of amortization
of the investment was just and reasonable, and the present use
was a source of danger to the public health, morals, safety
or general welfare of those who
have come to be occupants
54
of the surrounding territory.
In 1969, in Board of Supervisors of Cerro Gordo County v. Miller,55
the Iowa Supreme Court held an amortization ordinance requiring
the termination of an automobile wrecking business within five years
to be valid.
7. Kansas
In 1951, the Kansas Legislature enacted a county zoning statute
which, among other things, allowed the counties to adopt reasonable
regulations for the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses. '6G In
1953, Shawnee County adopted a county zoning plan regulating the
land lying within three miles of Topeka. The ordinance provided that
avto wrecking yards in residential districts were to be discontinued
within two years. Owners -of an auto wrecking yard that had been
zoned 'into a residential district under the plan challenged the ordi50. Id. at -,
205 N.E.2d at 465.
51. 69 Il. App. 2d 248, 215 N.E.2d 829 (1966).
52. Id. at
- , 215 N.E.2d at 830.
53. 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956).
54. Id. at , 78 N.V.2d at 84S.
55. 170 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1969).
56. KAN. STAT. A.-NN.
19-2930 (1974) provides in part as. follows: "The powers of this
act shall not b( exercised so as to deprive the owner of any existing property of its use
or maintenance for tihe purpose to which it is then lawfully devoted, except that reasonable regulations
IaN- le adopted for thf gradu;l elimilnatioir
,f nonconfornting uses."
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nance. In Spurgeon v. Board of Commissioners of Shawnee County,57
the Kansas Supreme Court held that the statute and ordinance were
not unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment and that the
evidence was sufficient to support the finding of the trial court that
the two year amortization period was reasonable.
8.

Louisiana

Louisiana appears to have been the first state to approve of the
termination of nonconforming uses. In 1929, in State ex. rel. Dema
Realty Co. v. McDonald5 9 and in State ex. rel. Dema Realty Co.
v. Jacoby,60 the Louisiana Supreme Court held a 1927 New Orleans
zoning ordinance valid. This ordinance prohibited the establishment
or operation of all businesses within a certain area of the city and
further provided that all businesses in that area then in operation
were to be liquidated within one year. In McDonald, the court said
that any business operated in violation of a zoning ordinance is a
public nuisance and that public authorities have the power to abate
public nuisances. 6 1 The court found no evidence that the ordinance
was arbitrary or unreasonable. 6' The court based its reasoning on
the then recent United States Supreme Court decision in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co",63 in which the concept of comprehensive zoning had been approved. The Louisiana court stated as
follows:
[I]f the village had the authority to create and to maintain a purely residential district, which the court held it did
have, and if such an ordinance was not arbitrary and unreasonable, it follows necessarily that the village was vested
with the authority to remove any business or trade from the
district and
to fix a limit of time in which the same shall
64
be done.
In Jacoby, the defendant, owner of a drug store, raised the constitutional issue of a taking of private property without just compensation. The court stated that private property is held "subject to
a reasonable exercise of the police power," 6' and found that the
ordinance was reasonable and constitutional in that it bore a substantial relation to the police power purpose of safety. The court
stated, "The inflammable tendency of mudh of the contents of these
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
62.
64.
65.

181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957).
Id. at 317 P.2d at 806.
16S La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929).
168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929).
168 La. at , 121 So. at 614-15.
Id. at , 121 So. at 616.
272 U.S. 365 (1926). See supra notes 8-11, and text accompanying.
168 La. at
, 121 So. at 617.
168 La. at , 123 So. at 316.
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stores is, of itself, sufficient to show that such a relation exists." 6
Despite this blank check given by the court in 1929, there appears
to have been little activity in Louisiana regarding amortization. The
next reported case out of Louisiana on the subject is Jameson v. St.
Tammany Parish Police Jury in 1969.6? In this case, the appellate
court, citing Jacoby, stated as follows:
It is ...well settled that since an owner holds property subject to the reasonable exercise of police power, he cannot
be heard to complain in regard to a zoning ordinance, passed
in legitimate exercise of such power, as a taking or damaging
his property without just compensation in violation of the Constitution. 8
9. Maryland
One of the most frequently cited and best reasoned cases on
amortization is Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.69
In this case, the Maryland Court of Appeals held a billboard amortization ordinance reasonable and constitutional. The court pointed out
that eminent domain and the law of nuisance have been ineffective
tools in eliminating nonconforming uses. The court stated as follows:
The effectiveness of eminent domain is restricted by the
necessity that the purchase must be for public use, by the
complexities of administrative procedures and by the high
cost of reimbursing the property owners. The law of nuisances
has limits that many times make its full use fall short of
the objective. Some courts will restrain only common law
nuisances and even where the lawmakers have expanded the
nuisance category, judicial enforcement seems often to have
been restricted to uses that cause a material and tangible
interference with the property or personal well-being of
others, uses that are equivalent to or are likely to become
common law traditional nuisances.7 0
The court then went on
nonconforming uses are
under the law of zoning,
and noxious uses in the

to state, "It has become apparent that if
to be dealt with effectively it must be
a law not limited in its controls to harmful
common law sense."' 71 The court analyzed

66. Id.
67. 225 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1969).
68. Id. at 724.
69. 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
70. Id. at -,
129 A.2d at 365-66. See DICKINSON, N.D. CITY CODE, Appendix A, § 6
(1954), and WILLISTON, N.D. CITY CODE, Appendix A, § 16 (1957), both of which allow
Purchase by condemnation of nonconforming uses and structures. See also N.D. CENT.
CODE § 11-33-21 (1976), which provides that a violation of a county zoning regulation
constitutes a public nuisance, and N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-01(44) (1968), which gives
municipalities the power to declare what constitutes a ruisancc.
71. 212 Md. a-t -,
129 A.2d at 366.
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the difference between prospective prohibition and amortization of
nonconforming uses, as follows:
The distinction between an ordinance that restricts future
uses and one that requires existing uses to stop after a reasonable time, is not a difference in kind but one of degree and,
in each case, constitutionality depends on overall reasonableness, on the 72importance of the public gain in relation to
the private loss.
As to the difference between regulations limiting existing nonconforming uses and amortization, the court stated as follows:
There is no difference in kind, either, between limitations that prevent the adding to or extension of a nonconforming use, or provisions that the right to the use is lost
if abandoned -or if the structure devoted to the use is destroyed, or the denial of a right to substitute a new use for
the old, all of which are common if not universal in zoning
laws and all of which are established as constitutional and
valid, on the one hand, and a requirement, on the other, that
an existing nonconformance must cease after a reasonable
time. The significance and effect of difference in degree
in any given case depends on circumstances, environment
73
and length of the period allowed for amortization.
in
The reasoning of Grant has since been followed in Maryland
7
a variety of other circumstances involving amortization. 4
10.

Minnesota

The principle of amortization was approved by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in 1968 in Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village
of Minnetonka.75 In this case the village had prohibited all commercial uses in residential districts. The removal of billboards was
required in three years. The court held the ordinance valid and
reasonable for aesthetic reasons. 6 The company had argued that
the ordinance was ultra vires since there was no express Minnesota
129 A.2d at 369.
72. Id. at -,
129 A.2d at 370.
73. Id. at -,
(county ordi74. See Shifflett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md. 151, 230 A.2d 310 (1967)
nance requiring elimination of junk yards In residential areas within 2 years upheld as
reasonable); Eutaw Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Baltimore, 241 Md. 686, 217 A.2d 348
(1966)
(city ordinance requiring termination of check cashing services In residential and
Harris v. Mayor & City
office use districts within IS months upheld as reasonable)
(city ordinance requiring roll
Council of Baltimore, 35 Md. App. 572, 371 A.2d 706 (1977)
back within 8 years of occupancy of nonconforming multiple family dwellings which had
been converted to 4 or more dwelling units upheld as reasonable). But see Stevens v.
(city." ordinance requiring removal of
City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 214 A.2d 775 (1965)
excess soil from lots more than 3 feet above curl) level, whether natural or filled ground,
at owner's expense, held invalid as unreasonable).
75. 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
, 162 N.W.2d at 213.
76. Id. at-
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statute allowing elimination of nonconforming uses by amortization.
To this argument, the court responded as follows:
The legislature, in giving municipalities broad land-useplanning powers, could not have intended to render them ineffective by denying to municipalities the power to eliminate
pre-existing nonconforming uses. Thus, even though the enabling statutes do not expressly give municipalities the power
to eliminate nonconforming uses, such a power is necessarily
implied from the broad grant of power to7 7establish and implement a comprehensive municipal plan.
11.

Nebraska

In Nebraska, a state statute provided that nonconforming uses
existing prior to its effective date may be continued. The Omaha
comprehensive zoning code incorporated this statute, but provided
elsewhere in the ordinance for the amortization of nonconforming
dog kennels within seven years. Notwithstanding this statute, the
Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as valid and constitutional in Wolf v. City of Omaha,7 as a matter of local, rather
than statewide, concern. The court stated this principle as follows:
The general principle has been established in many cases
that in the event of a conflict between a state statute and
a city ordinance, the state statute will prevail if the matter
is one of statewide concern, but that on the contrary the
city ordinance will prevail if the matter is one of purely
local concern, or one which only indirectly or remotely affects the people of the state outside the particular municipality. . . . The zoning here involved is a matter of local
concern rather than statewide concern.7 9
12.

New Hampshire

The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld amortization of nonconforming uses in Lachapelle v. Town of Goffstown in 1967.80 In
this case, the town had zoned an area residential and had allowed
nonconforming uses to continue. The ordinance allowed continuance
of junk yards for one year only, however, unless completely screened
from public view. The plaintiff, owner of an auto junk yard, had
not screened his junk yard and had applied to the town for an exception. The request for an exception was denied and this case followed. The court upheld the ordinance as valid and reasonable,
77.
78.

Id. at
-,
162 N.W.2d at 215.
177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964).
Id. at -,
129 N.W.2d at 515. It would appear to be a rare occurrence for a mu-

79.
nicipal zoning ordinance to become a matter of statewide concern.
80. 107 N.H. 485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967).
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after recognizing that junk yards are health and safety hazards and
create neighborhood blight."1
13.

New York

Prior to 1958, New York had only allowed the termination of nonconforming uses where the loss to the owner was insubstantial and
the use involved was an incidental use of property for recreational
or amusement purposes.8 2 In Harbison v. City of Buffalo,83 however,
the New York Court of Appeals approved the principle of amortization as applied to a business of reconditioning used steel drums and
barrels, a business that had begun as a cooperage in an unzoned
area in 1924. In 1926, the area was zoned for residential use, but
nonconforming uses were allowed to continue. In 1936, an ordinance
classified the business as a "junk yard" requiring annual licensing,
and in 1953, by ordinance amendment, junk yards in residential
areas were given three years to change to a conforming use. In 1956,
Harbison was given notice to discontinue the operation of his junk
yard at once and his application for a license renewal was denied.
He then commenced a mandamus action to compel issuance of the
license. 4 The court, in upholding the principle of amortization, stated
as follows:
[W]e have often stated in our decisions that the owner of
land devoted to a prior nonconforming use, or on which a
prior nonconforming structure exists (or has been substantially commenced), has the right to continue such use, but we
have never held that this right may continue virtually in perpetuity. Now that we are for the first time squarely faced with
the problem as to whether or not this right may be terminated after a reasonable period, during which the owner may
have a fair opportunity to amortize his investment and to
make future plans, we conclude that it may be, in accordance
with the overwhelming weight of authority found in the courts
of our sister States, as well as with the textwriters and commentators who have expressed themselves upon the subject. 85
81. Id. at -,
225 A.2d at 627. The New Hampshire Supreme Court had recognized
In 1964 that amortization was not unconstitutional per se in a case involving expansion of
a nonconforming use and grounded on public nuisance law. See McKinney v. Riley, 105 N.H.
249, 197 A.2d 218 (1964).
82. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952)
(raising of pigeons)
Peonle v. Bannett, 40 Misc. 2d 296, 243 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Nassau County Ct. 1963)/nnimals
In a nursery school).
83. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 152 N.E.2d 42 (195S).
84. Id. at 555-57, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 600-01, 152 N.E.2d at 43.
85. Id. at 561, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 604, 152 N.E.2d at 46. See Anderson, Amortization of
Nonconforming Uses-A Preliminary Appraisal of Harbisonz v. City of Buffalo, 10 SYR4Cuss L. REV. 44 (195S), for a general discussion of this case. See also People v. Goodman,
31 N.Y.2d 262, 338 N.Y.S.2d 97, 290 N.E.2d 139 (1972), where the Court of Appeals upheld a sign amortization ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power for aesthetic
purposes.
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14.

North Carolina

The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld amortization in 1975
in State v. Joyner.88 In this case, the city of Winston-Salem had
enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1968. The ordinance
provided that certain nonconforming uses, including building material
salvage yards such as that operated by the defendant, were to be
removed within three years. The defendant was convicted for violation of this ordinance. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance as valid. The court recognized that the majority
rule is that provisions for amortization of nonconforming uses are
valid if reasonable and rejected the per se rule which holds that all
8 7
amortization provisions are unconstitutional.
15.

Texas

The question of the validity of an amortization ordinance first
came before the Texas Supreme Court in 1953 in City of Corpus
Christi v. Allen. 8 In this case, the court held that the ordinance,
which provided for a two year period of amortization for auto wrecking yards, was an unconstitutional taking of property as applied because it was unreasonable. 9 The court did not expressly approve
of amortization in this case, but instead reserved its opinion and
stated, "Our conclusion is not to be construed as a holding that the
ordinance in question may not, under other circumstances, be invoked to terminate a non-conforming use, not a nuisance nor injurious
to the public health, morals, safety or welfare." 90
In 1956, a Galveston, Texas appellate court, in Caruthers v.
Board of Adjustment of the City of Bunker Hill Village,91 approved
an amortization ordinance and pointed out that Allen did not hold
amortization ordinances unconstitutional per se. 92 A Dallas, Texas,
appellate court also approved of amortization in Swain v. Board of
Adjustment of the City of University Park in 1968.93 In this case,
the city had passed an ordinance in 1940 rezoning property as residential and providing for a twenty-five year amortization period
for nonconforming uses. The appellate court held the twenty-five year
period valid and reasonable as applied to a gas station.14 In 1972, in a
case arising out of the same city ordinance, a Waco, Texas appellate
86. 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320 (1975),.appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975).
general dfiscussion of this case, see 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 754 (1975).
87. 286 N.C. at , 211 S.E.2d at 325.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

152
Id.
Id.
290
Id.
433
Id.

Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d) 759 (1953).
at , 254 S.W.2d at 761.
S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
at 345.
S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
at 735.
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court acknowledged the validity of amortization in general, but held
the ordinance unreasonable as applied to the owner of business
rental property.9 5 On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court, in its first
amortization case since Allen in 1953, reversed. In City of University
Park v. Benners,96 the court, citing Swain, expressly approved of
amortization as follows:
There are strong policy arguments and a demonstrable
public need for the fair and reasonable termination of nonconforming property uses which most often do not disappear
but tend to thrive in monopolistic positions, in the community.
We are in accord with the principle that municipal zoning
ordinances requiring the termination of nonconforming uses
under reasonable conditions are within the scope of municipal police power; and that property owners do not acquire
once
a constitutionally protected vested right in property 9uses
7
commenced or in zoning classifications once made.
16.

Washington

The Washington Supreme Court approved a Seattle amortization
ordinance in 1959 in City of Seattle v. Martin.98 In this case, an area
had been annexed by the city and zoned for residential use in 1954.
The zoning ordinance provided that nonconforming uses not in a
building were to be discontinued within one year. The defendant was
the lessee of a vacant lot in the annexed area and had used the
lot for the repair of construction equipment. He had been
using the lot for this purpose for nine years prior to the annexation. When he refused to discontinue use of the lot, he was
charged with violation of the ordinance, tried, and found guilty. On
appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. The court noted
that this was the first time that they "passed directly on the question of whether a city may take affirmative police power action to
compel termination of a nonconforming use." 99 The court stated that
the "test . . . is whether the significance of the hardship as to appellant is more compelling or whether it reasonably overbalances
the benefit which the public would derive from the termination of
the use. . .. "10 The court found the public benefit more compelling
10 1
and upheld the ordinance.
95. Benners v. City of University Park, 477 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), rev'd,
485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972).
96. 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 901 (1973), rehearing de.
nied, 411 U.S. 977 (1973).
97. Id. at 778.
98. 54 Wash. 2.d541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959).
99. Id. at -,
342 P.2d at 603 (emphasis in original).
100. Id.
101. Id.

at

,

342 P.2d at 604.
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B.

JURISDICTIONS DISAPPROVING AMORTIZATION

1. Michigan
In 1938, in the case of Austin v. Older,'0 2 the Michigan Supreme
Court upheld, as a proper exercise of the police power, an ordinance
which, while allowing existing nonconforming uses to continue, prohibited enlargement and imposed other restrictions. Although the
court stated that "the maximum benefit of zoning cannot be obtained as long as nonconforming businesses remain within residential
districts, and their gradual elimination is within the scope of the
police power, ' 1 0 3 amortization has not become a viable alternative
to the traditional restrictions permitted in Michigan. In 1947, the
Michigan Attorney General advised the legislature, which was considering an amortization statute, that such a statute would be invalid.' In 1962, in DeMull v. City of Lowell,'0 5 the Michigan Supreme
Court held that a city ordinance, which provided for a three year
amortization period for nonconforming auto junk yards, was ultra
vires. The court stated, "So far the legislature has permitted ordinances providing only for resumption, restoration, reconstruction,
extension or substitution of nonconforming uses. It has withheld permission to destroy them, by time limitation or otherwise."' 0 6
2.

Missouri

In Hoffman v. Kinealy,o7 the city of St. Louis had passed a zoning ordinance providing for the amortization of nonconforming uses
in two-family residential districts over a six year period. The use
in this case involved two lots used for the open storage of lumber,
building materials and construction equipment. The Missouri Supreme Court recognized that the spirit of zoning is to diminish and
decrease nonconforming uses. 0 8 After reviewing the cases for and
against amortization, the court stated that "we cannot embrace
the doctrine espoused by advocates of the amortization technique
that there is no material distinction between regulating the future
use of property and terminating pre-existing lawful nonconforming
uses."' 0 9 The court went on to hold the ordinance unconstitutional.
In our view of the matter, termination of relators' pre-existing lawful nonconforming use .. .would constitute the taking
102.
103.
104.

283 Mich. 667, 278 N.W. 727 (1938).
Id. at -,
278 N.W. at 730.
146 OP. MICH. ATT'y GEN. 217 (1947), cited ft Fredal v. Forster, 9 Mich. App. 215,
-,
156 N.W.2d 606, 614 n.10 (1967).
105. 368 Mich. 242, 118 N.W.2d 232 (1962).
106. Id. at , 118 N.W.2d at 237-38. See also Central Advertising Co. v. City of Ann
Arbor, 42 Mich. App. 59, 201 N.W.2d 365 (1972).
107. 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965).
108. Id. at 750.
109. Id. at 753.
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of private property for public use without just compensation
. . . a taking not to be justified as an exercise of the police
power which is always subject to, and may never transcend,
constitutional rights and limitations. 110
3.

New Jersey

In United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan,' the New
Jersey Supreme Court struck down an ordinance providing for a two
year amortization period for nonconforming billboards. A New Jer1 12
sey statute provides that nonconforming uses may be continued.
The court referred to this statute and stated as follows: "It is beyond
the power of a municipality to limit by zoning ordinance the right
expressly given the owner by this statute indefinitely to continue a
nonconforming use.""'1
4.

Ohio

In 1953 the Ohio Supreme Court, in City of Akron v. Chapman,'"
held an amortization ordinance invalid. The defendant in this case
had begun operating a junk business in 1916. In 1922 the property
was zoned for residential use. The 1922 zoning ordinance provided
that nonconforming uses in existence at the time of its enactment
could continue, but further stated, "[A] nonconforming use shall
be discontinued and removed when, in the opinion of the city council,
such use had been permitted to exist or continue for a reasonable
time."'' 1 In 1950, the city council passed another ordinance describing
the defendant's property, stating that the nonconforming use had
existed for a reasonable time, and giving the defendant one year
to discontinue the use. When the city brought an action to enforce
the ordinance, it was held invalid by the Ohio Supreme Court. The
court stated as follows:
The right to continue to use one's property in a lawful
business and in a manner which does not constitute a nuisance
and which was lawful at the time it was acquired is within
the protection of Section 1, Article XIV, Amendments, Constitution of the United States, and Section 16, Article I of the
Ohio Constitution, which provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 6
110. Id. at 754-55.
111. 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952).
112. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55D-68 (West Supp. 1977) provides as follows: "Any nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage of an ordinance may be
continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied and any such structure may be restored or repaired in the event of partial destruction thereof."
113. 11 N.J. at , 93 A.2d at 366-67. See also State v. Accera, 36 N.J. Super. 420, 116
A.2d 203 (1955).
114. 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).
115. Id. at-.
116 N.E.2d at 698 (emphasis deleted).
116. Id. at
, 116 N.E.2d at 700 (emphasis in original).
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Since the Chapman case in 1953, the Ohio courts have consistently
117
An Ohio appellate
refused to approve any amortization ordinance.
court, in 1974, was inclined to approve a sign amortization ordinance
because it regarded amortization as "the more modern and enlightened rule," but regretfully stated instead as follows:
[A]s we read the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court of
Ohio as well as the prior decisions of this and its sister
courts, we are not confronted with a matter of first impression but rather with a matter on which the law of Ohio has
118
been determined contrary to our inclination ....
5.

South Carolina

In James v. City of Greenville,1 10 property owned by the operator
of a trailer park was rezoned for single family residential use by the
city. The ordinance provided that nonconforming uses were to be
discontinued within one year from the effective date of the ordinance.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional as a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.
V. AMORTIZATION IN NORTH DAKOTA
There is no North Dakota case reported on the question of
whether amortization of nonconforming uses is a proper exercise'of
the police power, nor is there any express statutory authorization
for amortization. The only place nonconforming uses are mentioned
in the North Dakota Century Code concerns county zoning. 120 In addition to giving counties the power to zone, the statutes state that
nonconforming uses may be continued.1 21 The board of county commissioners, however, is authorized to regulate and control nonconforming uses.' 22 There are no comparable statutes for municipalities
117. S6e, e.g., Burt Realty Corp. v. City of Columbus, 21 Ohio St. 2d 265, 257 N.E.2d 355
(1970); Gates Co. v. Housing Appeals Bd. of the City of Columbus, 10 Ohio St. 2d 48,
225 N.E.2d 222 (1967) ; City of Akron v. Klein, 171 Ohio St. 207, 168 N.E.2d 564 (1960) ;
Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960). See also Note, Amortizatioa: A Means of Eliminating the Nonconforming Use in Ohio, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
1042 (1968).
118. 69 Ohio App. 2d 118, , 322 N.E.2d 309, 310 (1974).
119. 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d 661 (1955).
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-33-01 (1976).
121. N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-33-13 (1976) provides as follows:
The lawful use or occupation of land or premises existing at the time of the
adoption of a resolution hereunder may be continued, although such use or
occupation does not conform to the provisions thereof, but if such nonconforming use or occupancy is discontinued for a period of more than two
years, any subsequent use or occupancy of the land or premises shall be a
conforming use or occupancy. If the state acquires title to any land or premises, all future use or occupancy thereof shall be a conforming use or occupancy.
122. N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-33-14 (1976) provides ws follows: "The board of county commissioners, may, by resolutions, as herein provided, prescribe such reasnnble regulations,
not contrary to law, as it deems desirable or, necessary to regulate and control nonconforming uses and occupancies"
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and townships. Municipalities are given broad powers
to establish
zoning regufations,,3 and to engage in master planning. 12
4 Townships
are also given zoning authority."25 The preservation of existing
nonconforming uses, however, is not mentioned. The North
Dakota Constitution contains the typical provisions found in most
constitutions
relating to property rights,126 but the other states that
have approved
amortization have similar provisions. In sum, neither
the constitution,
the statutes, nor the case law address the subject of
amortization and
it appears to be an open question in this state.
Inasmuch as there is no express statutory prohibition
of amortization, several North Dakota cities have incorporated
amortization
provisions into their zoning ordinances.127 The typical
city ordinance
in North Dakota, however, provides for the continuation
of nonconforming uses while imposing the traditional restrictions.12 8
Valley City provided for the amortization of junk
yards in
residential areas over a three year period in 1952.129
Bismarck, in
1973, provided for the amortization of nonconforming
auto wrecking
yards and junk yards over a 180 day period, nonconforming
billboards over a 180 day period, nonconforming sand
and gravel extraction over a one year period, livestock feeding
over a 90 day
period, and garbage dumps and loam stripping
over 30 day periods. 130
One of the more comprehensive amortization ordinances
in
North Dakota is found in the Grand Forks City Code. 13
The Grand
Forks ordinance provides for a five year amortization
period for
nonconforming signs in certain residential districts,'13
and further
provides for a ten year period for nonconforming
advertising signs,
ten years for nonconforming business signs, and three
years for nonconforming advertising signs painted on building facings.13
Nonconforming junk yards are given one year, unless located
in an industrial
123. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 40-47 (1968 & Supp. 1977).
124. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 40-48 (1968 & Supp. 1977).
125. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 58-03-11 through 58-03-15
126. N.D. CONST. § 1 provides as follows: "All (1972).
men are by nature equally free
Independent and have certain inalienable rights,
fending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing andamong which are those enjoying and
protecting property and reputation;
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." (emphasis
N.D. CONST. § 13 provides, in part, as follows: added).
"No person, shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law." (emphasis added).
N.D. CONST. § 14 provid s, in part, as follows:
"Private property shall not
be taken or damagcd for public use without
Just compensation having been first
made to, or paid into court for the owner." (emphasis
added).
127. E.g., Bismarck, Grand Forks and Valley
City. See notes 129-36 infra, and text

and
deand

ac.

comparnying.
128. See, e.g., DICKINSON, N.D. CITY CODE,
Apnendix A, § 6 (1954) : FARGO, N.D.
REvISED ORDINANCES § 20-0320 (1972) ; WILLISTON,
N.D. CITY CODE, Appendix A, § 16 (1957).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

VALLEY CITY, N.D. CITY CODE, Appendix A, § 13(8)
(1952).
BrsmARCK,
N.D. CITY CODE, Ap-endix A, § 15.0211(9)
GRAND FORKs, N.D. CITY CODE § 19-0220 (1974).
Id. at § 19-0220(C)(1).
Id. at § 19-0220(D).

(1973).
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district and screened from view.13 ' Nonconforming mobile home courts
are given two years after the effective date of the ordinance, or ten
years after the last installation of water, sewer or other utility
facilities, or twenty years after original construction, whichever is
later. 13

5

The most comprehensive part of the ordinance, however,

deals with nonconforming structures and reads as follows:
[A]U1 non-conforming commercial or industrial uses of
buildings located within any R-A, R-l, R-2, R-3, R-4, R-5 and
R-6 Districts shall be discontinued and the building thereafter
devoted to a use permitted in the district in which 'such building is located, provided, however, that any such non-conforming uses in buildings existing at the effective date of this
ordinance which does not conform to the provisions of this
ordinance shall be discontinued within a reasonable period
of the building; uses of land which become non-conforming
by reason of a change in this ordinance shall also be discontinued within a reasonable period of amortization of the
building. A reasonable period of amortization shall be construed to be the normal life of the building after original
construction; 60% of normal life after the last major alteration prior to adoption of this ordinance; or 25% of normal
life after the date of adoption of this ordinance, whichever
shall be longer. Normal life shall be considered to be forty
(40) years for buildings of ordinary wood construction; fifty
(50) years for buildings of wood and masonry construction;
1
and sixty (60) years for buildings of fireproof construction."1
VI.

CONCLUSION.

As can be seen from the examination of the case law in Part
IV, the approach to amortization of nonconforming uses in the various jurisdictions has been diverse. For example, New Jersey has a
statute expressly allowing nonconforming uses to continue and the
New Jersey court therefore disapproves of amortization. Nebraska,
with a similar statute, approves of amortization by statutory construction. Kansas and Colorado have statutes permitting the gradual
elimination of nonconforming uses. The Michigan court will not allow
amortization because it is not expressly authorized by statute. The
Minnesota court states that the power to amortize can be implied
from statutes authorizing comprehensive zoning. Maryland and the
majority of states hold that amortization is constitutional if reasonable. Missouri and the minority hold that it is unconstitutional per se.
Its use in North Dakota is still in its infancy, but its spread appears likely. Whether amortization will eventually be declared con134. Id. at §
135. Id. at §
136. Id. at §
only by reason

19-0220(E).
19-0220(F).
19-0220(C)(2). § 19-0220(C)(3) exempts buildings that are nonconforming
of height, yard or area requirements.
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stitutional in this state is a matter of speculation. The North Dakota
Supreme Court generally appears to follow the majority. The words
of the Hughes court in upholding the constitutionality of zoning in
North Dakota in 1926 could equally be applied to the issue of amortization today. 37
Whatever the outcome in this state, drafters of amortization ordinances should be careful to make the amortization provisions as
reasonable as possible, particularly with regard to the length of the
grace period. Property rights are still strongly protected and should
38
not be treated lightly whatever the use involved.
LAWRENCE
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See supra note 7, and text accompanying.
For more examples of amortization ordinances, see C. CRAWFORD, JR., HANDBOOK OF
ZONING AND LAND USE ORDINANCES--WITH FORMS § 702 at 76-78 (1974); 3 A. RATHKOPF,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 504-08 (3d ed. 1972).
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